Il6 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION

schooling, led to the generalizations that certain tests could
be drawn up by which to measure the ratio of a child's
intelligence to the norm.

Obviously such generalizations in the first case are but
a starting-point for further work which either modifies the
ferst result or shows it to be faulty. Thus Terman's
modifications known as the Stamford Intelligence Tests
have now largely superseded the original set made by
Binet and Simon.

But when the generalization is found to be true it is
most useful to apply it to particular cases to see whether
they do or do not come into that class of experiences.
In everyday life such forms of judgement are usually distin-
guished by some such phrase asf A is a case of X ' or ' Well,
all instincts must find an outlet and curiosity is no ex-
ception '. The process is called deduction and there is
for those logically inclined a beautifully worked-out scheme
of the various forms of deductive reasoning—known as
syllogisms—showing which are correct, where fallacies
occur, &c. In ordinary life we do not, as a rule, use the
complete logical form; we do not, for example, say 'In-
stincts which are suppressed are dangerous. This is a
suppressed instinct, therefore this is dangerous/ But we
do use the deductive process constantly, not only in mathe-
matics and exact sciences but also in our daily judgements,
for by the process we accept the experience stored in
generalizations and use it to throw light on the problem
we are discussing. Only experience, coupled with what
native intelligence we have, can help us to class the special
problem under the right generalization, and argument con-
stantly goes on as to whether A is an example of generaliza-
tion B or C.

The joy is that once we have assured ourselves that it
is a case of B, all the experience, not only contained in
generalization B but also in others that follow with or
from it, is at our service. Thus if I decide A is a case of